Michael Frank Goodwin is charged with the 1988 murders in Los Angeles County of Mickey and Trudy Thompson and the conspiracy to commit those crimes. Although Los Angeles was the obvious venue under Penal Code sections 777, 781 and 790 (all further section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated), the Los Angeles County District Attorney declined to prosecute Goodwin for these murders because the evidence was insufficient for a successful prosecution. (See fn. 1, post.) Then, 13 years after the murders, the Orange County District Attorney filed these charges in Orange County under the alternative theories that (1) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder the Thompsons occurred in Orange County, or (2) preliminary acts preparatory to the murders occurred in Orange County. After the magistrate rejected Goodwin's argument that the evidence failed to meet the test for venue, Goodwin moved to set aside the information in superior court, arguing the evidence of venue was insufficient. (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(A).) The superior court denied Goodwin's motion, and this petition followed.

This is not the first time we have heard from Goodwin. Previously, he petitioned us following the denial of his motion to recuse the Orange County District Attorney, alleging a conflict in interest due to that official's personal relationship with the sister of Mickey Thompson. We denied that petition, allowing him to pursue his assertion below that Orange County lacked any disinterested purpose in prosecution. During the pendency of this proceeding, Goodwin filed a motion, requesting we augment the record of this petition to review the venue issue to include the pleadings and documents submitted in his previous petition for a writ. As all matters outside the record of the preliminary hearing are irrelevant to this proceeding, it must be denied. (See fn. 1, post.)

In 1984, Mickey Thompson ran a successful motor sport promotion company that sponsored indoor stadium races with small mini trucks. At the same time, Goodwin had a similar successful business promoting indoor motorcycle dirt track racing in stadiums. Thompson and Goodwin decided to merge businesses. After a series of failed races and a complete deterioration of their social and business relationship, Thompson sued Goodwin in Los Angeles in 1985. At trial, Thompson prevailed, and he obtained a judgment in the amount of $512,000 in May 1986, which eventually grew to about $766,000 with interest and attorney fees. Collecting the debt proved to be impossible when Goodwin and his company declared bankruptcy not long after the judgment was final. Moreover, Goodwin appealed the judgment, but the California Supreme Court ultimately rejected the appeal in early 1988.

On the morning of March 16, 1988, two African-American males were seen pushing 10-speed bicycles up Mount Olive Drive toward the Thompson house in Los Angeles County. A neighbor of the Thompsons, Anthony Triarsi, heard the clicking of bicycle gears, followed by gunshots. Running outside, he and his daughter, Alison, saw Mickey and Trudy Thompson on the ground in their driveway, with one of the African-American men standing over each of them. After Triarsi heard Mickey Thompson say, “[p]lease don't hurt my wife,” the man standing over Trudy Thompson paused, looked in the direction of Mickey Thompson, and then shot Trudy Thompson in the head. Triarsi ran inside his house to call 911, leaving Alison outside to see the other man shoot Mickey Thompson.

According to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, there was nothing at the crime scene to indicate robbery was a motive. When they arrived at the murder site, they found more than $4,000 in cash and $10,000 in jewelry on, or near the Thompsons' bodies. A bullet had shattered the driver's side window of the Thompsons' van, and there was a live nine-millimeter round found in the shattered glass. Additional live nine-millimeter rounds and spent casings were found near the bodies and in nearby vegetation where footprints were discovered.

After the murders, Mark Lillienfeld, a detective for the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, interviewed a number of people who had heard Goodwin threaten or disparage Thompson. Goodwin had already been eliminated as one of the actual shooters because he was not African-American. Nonetheless, his explicit hostility towards Thompson made him a suspect as the one who planned the crime.

Kathryn Weise, an employee of Goodwin at his motocross promotion business in Laguna Beach in 1986, overheard Goodwin complaining about Thompson on an almost daily basis. In one telephone conversation, she heard Goodwin say to Thompson, “[y]ou know, Mickey, [ ] I can take you out. Have you taken out and have you fixed.” Weise testified that at the conclusion of the conversation, Goodwin stated to her that he was “going to kill that son of a bitch.” During a second such conversation, Weise heard Goodwin tell Thompson that “[f]or $500 and a motorcycle, I'll have you killed.”

Weise also testified that, while housesitting for the Goodwins at their residence in Laguna Beach in 1986, she noticed a stun gun in a storage area that looked like the stun gun later found at the crime scene. When questioned further on cross-examination, she stated it looked “exactly” like the picture of the stun gun found at the murder scene, although she made no reference to the alteration with tape.

It should be noted that during her employment with Goodwin, Weise was actually a prison escapee. Eventually, Goodwin accused her of embezzling from him, and, although she was acquitted of those charges, her felonious status was discovered. At the time of Goodwin's preliminary hearing, Weise was in the custody of the Texas authorities for a probation violation. Weise made no attempt to hide her dislike of Goodwin during Lillienfeld's interview of her, although at the preliminary hearing she maintained she had no feelings about him, one way or the other.

William Wilson knew both Thompson and Goodwin, professionally and socially. Wilson, who previously had been a police officer for 27 years, testified at the preliminary hearing that when the Goodwins visited his home in San Diego in early 1988, Goodwin stated, “. . .Thompson is killing me . . . He's destroying me[;] he's taking everything I've got. I'm going to take him out.”

Several witnesses told Lillienfeld that they had heard similar things from Goodwin. Lillienfeld then testified as to their statements at the preliminary hearing. For example, Greg Keay, Goodwin's cousin, heard Goodwin say, “[t]hat partner of mine is rubbing me the wrong way[;] he's not going to be rubbing me much longer.” Between the time of the civil judgment and the murders, Goodwin told Kyle Dickerson, a mate on his boat, that “I'll spend every goddamn dime I have to bury that S.O.B.” James Davis, the pilot of Goodwin's boat, also heard Goodwin frequently speak of how much he hated Thompson.

Likewise, Penn Weldon, a former Los Angeles deputy sheriff, told Lillienfeld that he was hired by Goodwin as a private investigator in early 1988. Weldon met with Goodwin at a restaurant in Laguna Beach, and, according to Weldon, Goodwin stated Thompson had ruined his life, defrauded him on deals, taken everything that he had, and he was going to get even with Thompson. Weldon stated he was hired to conduct inquiries about Thompson and his attorneys, and to install a wiretap to eavesdrop on one attorney in particular.

In addition to Weise's testimony that she saw a stun gun at the Goodwin residence, Goodwin's ex-wife, Diane Seidel, told Detective Lillienfeld she had seen a similar stun gun in the nightstand when they shared a home in Laguna Beach. On the other hand, Doug Stokes, a Thompson family friend, informed Lillienfeld he saw a stun gun in one of the Thompson's family vehicles about a year before the murders. According to Stokes, the stun gun “somewhat” matched the description of the one found at the murder scene.

Years after the murders, new developments in the case occurred. In February 1999, Goodwin questioned Randy Garrell, owner of an Orange County gun store, about gun registration records, and again in 2000, Goodwin asked him specifically about stun gun registration laws. About the same time, Lillienfeld interviewed Gail Moreau Hunter, who told him that she was Goodwin's girlfriend in Colorado during 1991. During their relationship, she was privy to a conversation in which Goodwin took responsibility for the murders, having hired two “male Blacks . . . [because] they were cheap[; and] that they used bicycles so that they wouldn't be heard [so] early in the morning.” She subsequently told Lillienfeld that Goodwin never actually took credit for the crime but merely left that impression with her.

Then, in March 2001, an episode of America's Most Wanted aired on television featuring the Thompson murders. In response to this, Ron Stevens contacted Lillienfeld. Stevens stated that on the Friday before the murders, he saw two men sitting in a faded blue or green station wagon with Arizona license plates illegally parked in front of his house in Los Angeles, not far from the Thompson home. The driver of the car was looking through a pair of binoculars. When shown a photographic lineup, Stevens selected Goodwin's picture as the individual that “greatly resembled” the driver. Later, both Stevens and his wife were brought to a lineup, after which they told Lillienfeld that Goodwin was the driver they had seen in the station wagon with the binoculars.

25 Cal.4th 1046 and People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, and finding that Orange County had a “reasonable relationship with the crime” because the Thompson-Goodwin business was centered in Orange County. The magistrate also denied the motion to dismiss due to insufficiency of evidence, finding there was probable cause to hold Goodwin to answer for the murders and the conspiracy.

Goodwin contends the information must be set aside because Orange County lacked venue over the case. (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(A).) The basis of Goodwin's attack is two-fold. First, he complains the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing failed to establish a basis for venue under section 781; and second, the magistrate used the wrong criteria when it denied his motion to dismiss for lack of venue. We agree.

“[V]enue should be considered a question of law for determination by the court prior to trial . . . .” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 210. “[T]he People must prove . . . the facts underlying venue . . . by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 211.) “On review, a trial court's determination of territorial jurisdiction will be upheld as long as there is `some evidence' to support its holding. [Citations.]” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1117.)

The obvious venue for this case is Los Angeles. Section 777 confers venue on “any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which [the crime] is committed.” (§ 777; see Price v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1055.) This crime occurred in Los Angeles. Likewise, Los Angeles is the only county with venue under the more specific statute, section 790, which places venue for a homicide offense “in the county where the fatal injury was inflicted or in the county in which the injured party died or in the county in which his or her body was found.” (§ 790, subd. (a).) Here, the “fatal injury was inflicted[,]” the Thompsons' died in, and their bodies were found in Los Angeles.

However, the question is not which county is the more appropriate venue; the issue is whether Orange County has venue at all. (See People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 218.) Another venue statute, section 781, provides that “[w]hen a public offense is committed in part in one jurisdictional territory and in part in another, or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory.” The prosecution rests its argument in favor of venue on section 781.

Invoking that statute, the People insist there are two preparatory “acts,” which are each independently sufficient to confer venue over the murders in Orange County. As a separate ground for venue under section 781, the People propose the commission in Orange County of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder the Thompsons provided another basis for the prosecution in Orange County. We analyze these theories seriatim.

In our examination, we are governed by certain rules. Because Goodwin petitioned us following the denial of his motion under section 995, we are limited to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. (See Merrill v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1596.) Thus, we deny Goodwin's motion to augment the record with the pleadings from the motion to recuse the Orange County District Attorney's Office and his motion for judicial notice of the grand jury hearing transcript. Likewise, we cannot consider the forensic expert's conclusions, belatedly obtained and submitted to us in a letter, excluding any firearm owned by Goodwin as one of the two murder weapons. However, in accordance with the request by the Orange County District Attorney's Office, we eliminate from our consideration any theory or argument propounded by that office that Goodwin might have owned one of the murder weapons.

We cannot assess the sufficiency of the evidence; we are to note only the complete lack of evidence to constitute probable cause for venue. (See 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Illustrations: Prohibition Granted, § 245, pp. 454-455.) Therefore, “`[t]he writ will issue if no competent evidence was offered at the preliminary examination to support a reasonable belief that the offense charged was committed and that the defendant committed it.' [Citation.]” (Davis v. Superior Court (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 8, 23.)

Goodwin contends that the only competent evidence was the sworn testimony of the witnesses who were actually present and placed under oath at the preliminary hearing. He contends Lillienfeld's hearsay statements of Stevens, Keay, Dickerson, Weldon, Stokes, Garrell and Hunter were inadmissible for purposes of establishing venue. At the hearing, Goodwin objected to Lillienfeld's hearsay testimony, but the trial court overruled his objection under the authority of section 872, subdivision (b). We must resolve this issue before proceeding further.

Goodwin notes that section 872, subdivision (b), provides that, notwithstanding the bar to hearsay evidence found in “Section 1200 of the Evidence Code, the finding of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer relating the statements of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted. . . .” (Italics added.) Goodwin emphasizes that such hearsay can only be used for “the finding of probable cause” as that is defined in section 872, subdivision (a). (See generally, Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1070.) He contends that the Legislature, had it intended for such hearsay to be used for any purpose other than “probable cause,” would have specifically provided for such in the statute. As the language of section 872, subdivision (b) is unambiguous, we cannot look beyond the statute's words to understand or interpret its terms. (See Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1123 [“`“If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .”'”].) Thus, Goodwin contends, we are barred from using Lillienfeld's hearsay testimony in the finding of venue.

The district attorney replies that Goodwin waived the issue by not objecting to the use of the testimony for the specific purpose of establishing venue at the preliminary hearing. He concedes that Goodwin objected to Lillienfeld's testimony on hearsay, relevancy, and foundational grounds, but maintains Goodwin was required to specify that his hearsay objection related to the venue issue (cf. People v. Drumgo (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 479, 482 [“If a defendant does not object to the offered evidence upon a specific ground or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court ordinarily he will be precluded from raising that as an issue for the first time on the appeal.”]), as distinct from the finding of probable cause, which is the purpose of a preliminary hearing. (§ 866, subd. (b).) As Goodwin's objection was overruled with an invocation of section 872, subdivision (b), it was clear that the magistrate understood the objection to be a general one against hearsay for probable cause purposes, not specifically for venue. The district attorney concludes that had Goodwin informed the court that his hearsay objection related to the issue of venue-thus, not affected by section 872, subdivision (b)-the court and prosecution would have had the opportunity to cure the deficiency by bringing in the witnesses. (See generally, People v. Scaffidi (1993) 11 Cal.App.4th 145, 150;

An objection, naming hearsay as the basis, is sufficient to alert both the proponent of the evidence and the court of the specific grounds for exclusion under most circumstances. (1 McCormack, Evidence (5th ed. 1999), § 52, p. 227.) It informs the opposing party that the desired testimony should be obtained from the actual source: a witness, who can then be cross-examined and whose credibility can be assessed directly by the trier of fact. (See People v. Bob (1946) 29 Cal.2d 321, 325.) As the prosecution has failed to direct us to any authority contradicting this general rule, its waiver argument cannot be sustained. Thus, all statements of absent witnesses, admitted via the testimony of Lillienfeld under the auspices of section 872, cannot be used in our review of the venue finding.

The People argue that Goodwin committed certain preliminary acts “requisite to the completion of the offense” in Orange County, thereby conferring venue here. Specifically, it is alleged he provided a stun gun to the killers from his Orange County home and drove from his home to Los Angeles to spy on the Thompsons a few days before the murders. The Orange County District Attorney also argued that a nine-millimeter gun, previously owned by Goodwin but never found after the murders, probably was the murder weapon. Due to the defense's persistence, further testing was done. The more detailed analysis eliminated Goodwin's guns as the murder weapons. Subsequently, the People withdrew this contention from our consideration after the initial oral argument in this proceeding.

According to the People, Goodwin furnished the killers with a stun gun from his Laguna Beach home in Orange County. As evidence of this fact, the People argue Weise saw a stun gun at Goodwin's residence two years before the murders, and then a conspicuously altered stun gun was found near the murder scene, although not used in the murders. From this, the prosecution argues the magistrate was permitted to infer that Goodwin must have supplied the killers with a stun gun in, or from Orange County. This constitutes a preparatory act of the homicides and thus, venue is established in Orange County. As this alleged act is likewise the overt act charged in the conspiracy, it provides the basis for the prosecution of that count in Orange County as well.

Although the People concede the stun gun was not used in the murders, they theorize that the stun gun was brought to the residence for the purpose of immobilizing Mickey Thompson so that he would be forced to witness his wife's murder. While this theory may be factually true, it fails to take into consideration that any preparatory act alone is insufficient to confer venue. Rather, only those acts and effects which “constitut[e] or [are] requisite to the consummation of the offense” (§ 781) are adequate to establish venue.

“Courts have construed the phrase `requisite to the consummation of the offense' to mean requisite to achieving the offender's unlawful purpose. [Citation.]” (People v. Bismillah (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 80, 85.) “Obviously, the phrase, `or requisite to the consummation of the offense[,]'[] means requisite to the completion of the offense-to the achievement of the unlawful purpose-to the ends of the unlawful enterprise. By the use of the word `consummation,' the [L]egislature drew a distinction between an act or an effect thereof which is essential to the commission of an offense, and an act or effect thereof which, although unessential to the commission of the offense, is requisite to the completion of the offense-that is, to the achievement of the unlawful purpose of the person committing the offense.” (People v. Megladdery (1940)

Without a doubt, the use of a firearm was necessary to the completion of the murders. The stun gun, however, was not. In fact, the People concede the stun gun was only “potentially useful” in the commission of the homicides, and was never used in this case. The People recognize the evidentiary weakness of the stun gun, and admit that “[o]n the surface, [the] evidence [of the stun gun] may not seem particularly forceful.” However, the People contend that its “significance is greatly enhanced by one other piece of evidence.” Twelve years after the murders, Goodwin asked Garrell, an owner of a gun store, about stun gun registration laws. Garrell's statements, however, were admitted through Lillienfeld's testimony, and therefore cannot be used in our review.

Second, the People provided no evidence that the stun gun observed at Goodwin's residence in 1986 was the stun gun found at the murder scene in 1988. Third, the People failed to present any evidence that the stun gun seen in 1986 remained in Orange County from 1986 until 1988, or that it was provided to the killers in or from Orange County.

We are mindful that “it is [our] duty . . . to discard-as unreasonable-inferences which derive their substance from guesswork, speculation, or conjecture [citations].” (Birt v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 934, 938.) An unreasonable inference is the same as no inference at all. In this case, it is unreasonable to infer that, simply because Goodwin lived in Orange County, he must have given the murderers a stun gun from his home that may have been seen there two years before. A finding cannot be sustained on an inference unreasonably reached from circumstantial evidence.

As an alternative argument, the People aver that venue is conferred on Orange County due to the conspiracy charge, which alleged that the overt act of that conspiracy-that “[o]n or about, March of 1988, Michael Frank Goodwin provided a stun gun to the actual killers from his Laguna Beach home”-occurred in Orange County. But there was no evidence presented at the preliminary hearing that such a transfer ever took place; or, assuming a transfer occurred, where it took place. Thus, for the same reason we decline to find that venue is conferred pursuant to section 781, we also find the People failed to present “some evidence” that Goodwin, while in Orange County, provided the stun gun to the murderers to constitute an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

In 2001, after an episode of America's Most Wanted aired on television, the Stevenses responded and told the Los Angeles detective that they resided in the Thompsons' neighborhood at the time of the homicides. Although Lillienfeld was unable to connect Goodwin to a vehicle similar to the one described by the Stevenses, Weise remembered that one of Goodwin's employees had an old station wagon with out-of-state plates, and she had seen it parked in Goodwin's business parking lot.

The People, invoking certain language of section 781, also insist venue is established based on “effects” in Orange County. Similar to the magistrate's stated basis for denying Goodwin's motion to dismiss for lack of venue, the People contend the negative relationship between Thompson and Goodwin-i.e., the business dispute, the bankruptcy and the fact that Thompson outbid Goodwin on a motocross event in Anaheim-conferred venue on Orange County. While these facts may be evidence of what fueled the animosity between Goodwin and Thompson and may explain the motive for the killings, relying on them for venue is flawed because these facts do not constitute effects “requisite to the consummation of the offense.”

In denying Goodwin's motion to dismiss, the magistrate cited People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1082 and Price v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1046, and then found there was a “reasonable relationship” between Goodwin and the offense, thus conferring venue on Orange County. Specifically, the magistrate focused on Goodwin and Thompson's business relationship, which was centered in Orange County, notwithstanding that the test for venue is not whether there was a relationship between the parties while in that county. (See § 781.)

The magistrate misunderstood Price v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1046 when it invoked it as its authority. In Price, the court considered the issue of vicinage and the application of section 784.7, which provides for jurisdiction for more than one act of criminal sexual conduct or child abuse. Although the court in Price stated in dictum that “[t]he Legislature's power to designate the place for trial of a criminal offense is limited by the requirement that there be a reasonable relationship or nexus between the place designated for trial and the commission of the offense” (id. at p. 1075), the phrase is a generalization and not the actual test for venue, which is set out in section 781.

The magistrate also cited People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1082. In Simon, a peace officer attempted to make a traffic stop on Simon, who responded by leading the officer in a high-speed chase. During the officer's pursuit of him, Simon assaulted the officer. Simon held that “when criminal conduct in one county results in a police pursuit and an assault on a pursuing officer in another county, under section 781 the assault charge may be tried in the county where the initial criminal conduct occurred.” (Id. at p. 1109.) However, we are not dealing with a crime commenced in one county and then continued into another county by a hot pursuit.

In considering the application of section 781 to the facts of this case, we must “construe the provision liberally in order to achieve its underlying purpose, which is to expand venue beyond the single county in which a crime may be said to have been committed [citations]-consistently, of course, with `protecting a defendant from being required to stand trial in a distant and unduly burdensome locale' [citation].” (People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 218-219.) We agree with the need to “interpret section 781 in a commonsense manner with proper regard for the facts and circumstances of the case rather than technical niceties. [Citation.]” (People v. Bismillah, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 85.) However, commonsense dictates that there must be some evidence and not mere conjecture connecting the crime with the local jurisdiction.

“As past decisions recognize, venue provisions applicable to criminal proceedings serve a variety of purposes. First, `[v]enue in the place where the crime was committed promotes the convenience of both parties in obtaining evidence and securing the presence of witnesses.' [Citation.] Second, from the perspective of a defendant, statutory enactments that provide for trial in a county that bears a reasonable relationship to an alleged criminal offense also operate as a restriction on the discretion of the prosecution to file charges in any locale within the state that it chooses, an option that, if available, would provide the prosecution with the considerable power to choose a setting that, for whatever reason, the prosecution views as favorable to its position or hostile or burdensome to the defendant's. . . . Finally, venue provisions also serve to protect the interests of the community in which a crime or related activity occurs, `vindicat[ing] the community's right to sit in judgment on crimes committed within its territory.' [Citation.]” (People v. Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)

While we are mindful that section 781 should be applied liberally, nothing can justify an expansion of vicinage beyond what is permitted under the terms of the statute. The facts of this case, in particular, cry against such action. The fatal injury inflicted on the victims occurred at their residence in Los Angeles County. The victims died at their residence in Los Angeles County. The victims' bodies were found at that residence in Los Angeles County. All of the witnesses were located in Los Angeles County, and Goodwin was arrested in Los Angeles County. Finally, for the past 15 years, the case has been-and continues to be-investigated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

The prosecution proposes that Goodwin had to have planned the murders while in Orange County as that was his place of business and residence before, and for a short time after the crimes. Thus, the magistrate was reasonable in concluding that at least some preparatory acts must have occurred there. To support that conclusion, the prosecution relies on People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th 193, People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822 and People v. Mitten (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 879. In all three cases, the conclusion was drawn that a murder was planned in the county of prosecution even though the location of the defendant's criminal act occurred elsewhere.

In Posey, the crimes were two drug transactions that occurred in San Francisco County, at the border with the prosecuting county, Marin. The transactions were negotiated via recorded phone calls made between the defendants in San Francisco and the undercover officer in Marin. Applying section 781, the Supreme Court noted, “venue turns on the presence or absence, in a county, of acts or effects constituting the crime or requisite to the commission of the crime-not on the defendant's state of mind or on the soundness of any beliefs that he or she might hold as to the location of those acts or effects.” (People v. Posey, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 221.) The evidence that comprised those acts or effects were the telephone calls that the defendants placed in San Francisco to the undercover officer in Marin, even though the defendants thought they were calling Santa Rosa, not Marin. (Id. at pp. 220-221.)

In Crew, the actual location of the murder was never established. It occurred somewhere between Santa Cruz and Fremont, but the body was never found. The case was filed in Santa Clara County, which was where the victim lived, and from where the victim commenced a cross-country trip with the defendant. A day later, defendant arrived in nearby Fremont without the victim but with her belongings, which he promptly sold or gave away. On appeal after conviction, Crew contended the jury never specifically found whether venue had been established in Santa Clara County. The Supreme Court rejected the attack, noting that Crew failed to draft an instruction to that effect. Venue in Santa Clara County was upheld under the authority of section 781. In doing so, the Supreme Court held “[t]here is evidence that defendant formed the intent to kill [the victim] while in Santa Clara County, because he discussed doing so with [a witness who testified under a grant of immunity] in that county. The evidence also supports the conclusion that the events culminating in Nancy's death arose and occurred at least in part in Santa Clara County. Defendant picked up Nancy at her friend's apartment in San Jose, Santa Clara County, where they loaded her belongings into the trailer and her car. The fateful trip began at the San Jose apartment from which defendant and Nancy left to go to her parents' house in Santa Cruz and from which they drove through Santa Clara County to a hotel in Fremont, . . . where within a day or two, and perhaps as shortly as within a few hours after passing through Santa Clara County, defendant killed Nancy. . . .” (People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 836.)

The pivotal facts on which the Supreme Court's conclusions of venue in Crew and Posey rested are not present in this case. Weise overheard fights between Goodwin and Thompson, and on one occasion, heard Goodwin exclaim that he “was going to kill that son of a bitch,” but no one testified to Goodwin's planning a crime. No one could testify as to telephone calls being placed by Goodwin in Orange County negotiating the crime or planning the details of it. The Thompsons were not “last seen” with Goodwin, as was the victim in Crew, and Goodwin was never seen in possession of their personal possessions stolen at the time of the murders. Such facts were the crucial reasons that venue, under section 781, was upheld in Posey and Crew. They simply do not exist here.

Similarly, in People v. Mitten, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 879, the defendant was charged in Contra Costa County with being an accessory after a murder. The murder occurred in that county, but Mitten's actions dealt with the burial of the bodies in Mendocino County. Arguing that he should have been prosecuted in Mendocino County, Mitten prevailed in his motion to dismiss in the trial court. The prosecution then appealed from that dismissal.

The reviewing court focused on the overall crime, which included not only the murder but also the subsequent disposal of the bodies. Several persons assisted in the concealment of the homicide, not just Mitten. The killers turned the bodies over to these accessories, who then traveled through Contra Costa County before arriving in Mendocino County, where Mitten met them and disposed of the bodies down an abandoned well. Contrary to Mitten's conclusion that there was no connection between Contra Costa County and the disposal of the bodies, the reviewing court noted that “[it] was Mitten who told Wethern that the headman [] wanted to talk to him, and it was he who waited by the roadside to lead the party to the burial ground. From this the obvious inference follows that Mitten had previously participated with his Contra Costa County accomplices, by telephone or otherwise, in the planning of the crime.” (People v. Mitten, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 885.)

A similar inference cannot be drawn here. We do not have any evidence putting Goodwin at the scene of the murders or at the disposal of the bodies. The evidence is incontrovertible that he was not there. This is not a prosecution of an accessory to a crime completed in the prosecuting county. To the contrary, the prosecuting county is not connected with the murders at all. That is the problem.

We emphasize that any new evidence, not previously considered by the Los Angeles District Attorney prior to its rejection of the case, can-and should-be given to the Los Angeles District Attorney for reconsideration of that decision, or to the Office of the Attorney General for its review and consideration. (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 13; Gov. Code, § 125500; § 923.)